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Summary  
Discussion and debate about Sino-Russian relations is on the rise and attracts the 
attention of experts and policy-makers around the world. Russia and China are 
arguably two of the biggest players in the international system and their strategic 
partnership already possesses a great geopolitical weight. Through detailed 
investigation of this bilateral relationship over a variety of issue areas, I argue that 
the Sino–Russian rapprochement is externally driven rather having its own structure 
and dynamics. More specifically, realism’s balance of power theory and balance of 
threat theory provide a relatively convincing explanation regarding the driving 
factors of Sino-Russian rapprochement. The West is still a top priority for Russian 
and Chinese policymakers and will still be in the near future. But as China enters the 
21century apparently poised to become a new superpower, Russia will have little 
choice but to make China a priority in its own right, independent of Moscow’s 
relationship with the West. But right now, the relationship of between China and 
Russia is largely driven by the dynamics of superpower polarity rather than having a 
structure of its own.  
 
1. Introduction 
Discussion and debate about Sino-Russian relations is on the rise and attracts the 
attention of experts and policy-makers around the world. Russia and China are 
arguably two of the biggest players in the international system and their strategic 
partnership already possesses a great geopolitical weight. China is on its meteoric 
rise through economic development, while Russia still is considered as a military 
superpower. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the relationship between the two 
giants has been dramatically improving. At the 2011 summit of Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, has 
expressed that the frequent exchanges between the two countries' leaders have 
fostered a high level of political mutual trust and facilitated the development of 
bilateral ties.1 The bilateral trade between two countries is also growing at an 
unprecedented pace. But a closer look at this partnership will reveal many diverging 
interests and differences.  
                                                        
1 Xinhua 2011.11.08: Chinese, Russian PMs reach consensus on major issues 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-11/08/c_122247772.htm 
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There are differing opinions among scholars on the nature and the future of Sino-
Russian partnership. A bullish view on the subject would be a further rapprochement 
between the two countries, eventually leading to somewhat of an alliance.2 A 
bearish view would write the partnership off as being “long on rhetoric and short on 
substance”.3 So where is this relationship going? This paper aims at addressing the 
above question in a comprehensive way.  
On theoretical level, the paper tries to examine the following questions: Is Sino-
Russian partnership largely determined by the dynamics of superpower polarity at 
the global level or does the partnership has its own structure and dynamics that 
either override or interact with those at the global level? 
In the first part, the theoretical framework of analysis is developed. The framework 
seeks to take a closer look at what spurs alliances, balance, opportunities for 
cooperation, by looking how factors like states' intentions, trust, dependence, 
defensive and offensive, capabilities play into alliance building. My proposed 
framework sits in a realist interpretation of state behaviour and alliance building.  
According to Stephen Walt4, the changing distribution of power, or balance of threat 
is what that drives states to seek alignments with others. Therefore, only from a 
systemic perspective, can we identify the underlying dynamics of the Sino–Russian 
rapprochement in the post-Cold War era. The second part focuses on giving an 
insight into foreign policy modus operandi of Russia and China. In order to 
understand how Chinese leadership views the Sino-Russian partnership, it is 
important to understand how Russia fits into China’s overall foreign policy 
framework and worldview and vice versa. With this chapter, I want to demonstrate 
that neither Russia nor China is originally interested in entering into a formal 
alliance. The third part focuses on the formulation of current state of Sino-Russian 
relations, focusing on current state of energy, economic, military and foreign policy 
cooperation. Through this chapter, I want to illustrate and underline that the 
rapprochement is not driven by internal, or bilateral factors, but rather by external 
                                                        
2 Li 2007 
3 Lo 2008 
4 Walt 1987 
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dynamics of superpower polarity. In the final conclusion section, I will touch upon 
the question of where the Sino-Russian relation is heading in the foreseeable future.  
 
2. Theoretical framework 
2.1 Alliance formation 
From 1939 to the present, leading theorists and policymakers have continued to 
view the world from a realist point of view. Realist school of thought puts its 
emphasis on interests, rather than ideology, seeking peace through strength and 
recognition of that Great Powers can coexist despite their opposing values and 
beliefs. As argued by Robert Keohane, the fact that Realism offers something of a 
manual for maximizing the interest of a state in a hostile environment explains in 
part why it still remains “the central tradition in the study of world politics”5.  
 
The unifying theme around which all realists base their views on is centred on the 
assumption that world politics unfold in an international anarchy, or a system with 
no overarching authority. This means that states are the paramount actors and 
because the one’s survival cannot be guaranteed under anarchy, the first priority for 
state leaders is to ensure continued existence of their state.6 In other words, 
“national interest is the final arbiter in judging foreign policy”7.  
 
Because states operate in anarchical environment and because all states must 
pursue their own national interests, other countries and governments can never be 
completely relied upon. This brings us to another important concept of realist 
thinking, the self-help principle. This principle states that each state is responsible 
for ensuring their well-being and survival. In order to do that, states can augment 
their power capabilities. Smaller states or states with relative disadvantage in power 
capabilities, thus engage in what is called the balance of power. Most common 
definition of the balance of power holds that smaller states should enter into an 
alliance to counter a threat from a larger state or hegemony. The purpose of the 
                                                        
5 Keohane 1989: 36  
6 Dunne & Schmidt 2004: 164 
7 Jackson & Sørensen 2002: 68 
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balance of power is to attain a state of equilibrium where no one state or alliance of 
states is able to dominate the other.  
 
Kenneth Waltz, a major contributor to the development of the theory, expressed in 
his book, "Theory of International Politics" that "if there is any distinctively political 
theory of international politics, balance-of-power theory is it." In international 
politics overwhelming power repels and leads others to balance against it.  Waltz’s 
point of departure stems from his view of distribution of power in the international 
system, as a key variable to understanding important international outcomes such as 
war, peace, alliances and the balance of power. According to the logic outlined 
above, there are several goals instrumental to preventing hegemony. One is to 
maintain the independence of other states in the system; another is to maintain 
power equilibrium through combination of individual state capabilities and 
aggregation of state capabilities in coalitions.8 This in turn leads to possible balancing 
formations against the potential hegemon.  
Extending this logic to China and Russia, purely from theoretical point of view and 
acknowledging U.S.A as the current hegemon, both countries should’ve engaged in a 
balancing alliance against the latter. This has not yet happened. On the other side, 
since the end of the Cold-War and emergence of U.S.A as the sole superpower, none 
of the other states have engaged in overt counterbalancing alliances against the 
hegemon, mainly because America never showed aggressive intentions toward 
them. Empirically speaking, one can say that states only engage in balancing 
activities against those who they perceive as a threat – a core argument of the 
balance of threat theory proposed by Stephen Walt in his article titled “Alliance 
Formation and Balance of Power”. 
 
Instead of looking at alliances simply as mechanisms to balance power in an 
international system, Walt9 sees alliances arising as a response to a "threat”. 
This would mean that a state’s alliance behaviour is determined not by the state’s 
                                                        
8 Paul, Wirtz & Fortmann 2004: 32 
9 Walt 1987: 17-49 
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power capacity but rather by the degree of threat they perceive from other states. 
Walt identifies four criteria states use to evaluate the threat posed by another state: 
its aggregate strength (size, population, and economic capabilities), its geographical 
proximity, its offensive capabilities, and its offensive intentions. Walt argues that the 
more other states view a rising state as possessing these qualities, the more likely 
they are to view it as a threat and balance against it.  
 
Although not viewing China as an immediate military threat, Russian leaders are 
nonetheless wary of the rising China. After analyzing several Russian and Chinese 
scholarly articles, one can discern a threat perception gap existing in both countries. 
In general, the prevalence of “China threat” theory is much more discussed in 
Russian academic articles, with the “Russia threat” almost non-existent among 
Chinese counterparts.    
 
In Chinese academic discourse, although still being seen as a “pole”(极), Russia is no 
longer a superpower on equal footing with United States.10 The strategic distrust 
towards USA, is today of much greater concern for Chinese leaders than Russia. This 
was underlined in a monograph by Lieberthal & Wang, which concluded that “U.S. - 
China strategic distrust is growing” and “is potentially very corrosive”11.  
 
In Russia, China’s role as a competitor is much more prevalent. For example, 
Russians are much more wary of Chinese economic penetration especially in regards 
to Russian Far East (RFE).12  A prominent Russian scholar, Alexander Lukin, wrote 
that the main obstacle to successful economic co-operation is “the aggressive and 
selfish manner of China to uphold its trade interests, not always taking its partners’ 
interests into account”.13 Extending Walt’s theory to the situation, one might argue 
that Russia seeing China as a threat chooses to engage in the act of balancing against 
China, thus effectively putting roadblocks to further rapprochement.   
                                                        
10 Ma 2005: 8 
11 Lieberthal & Wang 2012 
12 Lo 2008 (b): 4  
13 Lukin 2007: 145  
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2.2 Is Sino-Russian alliance a possibility at all?  
For realists like, John Mearsheimer14, prospects for cooperation are far too grim in 
general. This is because states are power maximizers either because it is the means 
by which they can ensure their security or because they want other values that 
power is believed to bring. The situation concerning alliances is akin to that of 
prisoners' dilemma in game theory, where the players are unsure of the intentions 
of their partners, so that both choose not to cooperate. The premise for such an 
outcome is that the pay-offs from non-cooperation should be higher than those from 
cooperation. Because many alliances are structured in a way that the states can 
expect more payoffs from cheating or exploiting the partner, it seems inevitable that 
those alliances will eventually fail. Unfolding this logic to its maximum extent, China 
will continue to maximize its power in Asia, pushing it inevitably to the edge of 
conflict with Russia. But is this scenario very likely?  
Waltz would argue that an alliance between China and Russia is very much plausible 
as long as USA maintains its position as a global superpower. Walt on other hand will 
focus more on threat perceptions and how they develop over time. Thus altering of 
Russia’s perception of China, or China’s threat perception of USA can have an impact 
on relationship between the two countries.  
 
3. Modus Operandi of Chinese and Russian Foreign Policies 
3.1 Understanding Chinese Foreign Policies 
3.1.1 Three basic concepts  
In Chinese foreign policy debates, one can discern three key concepts: shi, identity 
and strategy. Shi (势), a term that doesn’t easily translate itself to English, refers to 
an “overall configuration of power and the direction or tendency of the process of 
change in which an actor acts and interacts.”15 It in itself involves two other 
important concepts: discernible broad trends and international power arrangement, 
or as Chinese call it guoji geju (国际格局). This concept of shi is important in 
                                                        
14 Mearsheimer: 2001 
15 Zhu 2010: 17 
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formulating China’s middle-and-long term strategies and involves following 
questions: Who is the dominant power? Will the current configuration of power 
bring harm to China? Can it maintain the peace and stability of the world? What is its 
broad trend of development?16  
 
The concept of Identity, in international relations, as defined by prominent scholar 
Alexander Wendt, is ”a property of intentional actors that generates their 
motivational and behavioural disposition”.17 Concept of strategy refers to how 
national interests can be achieved within the framework of the international system. 
For China, it is largely derived from its understanding of shi.   
 
3.1.2 Shi of today  
Because power in China is very concentrated amongst the elite leaders, their 
perception of the world greatly influences the basic orientation of China’s foreign 
policy. During most of Mao Zedong’s reign, the world was perceived as pro-capitalist 
and confrontational towards China. Therefore the whole country was mobilized as 
though the war was inevitable. Deng Xiaoping’s perceptions were rather diverging. 
Because he viewed that war could be avoided and the peace and development were 
the shi of his time, he initiated the era of reform and opening up, otherwise known 
as gaige kaifang (改革开放 ). 
 
The bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 sparked a nation wide debate 
and reconsideration of the western world’s intentions and especially the role of 
American leadership. One of the more prominent voices in the debate was He Fang   
(何方), former director of the Institute of Japan Studies at the China Academy of 
Social Sciences (CASS). He concluded that the world had entered into a new era of 
peace and development and that it was quite possible for China to avoid war and 
cooperate with the West instead.18  
 
                                                        
16 ibid. p.18 
17 Wendt 1999: 225 
18 He Fang, Lun Heping yu Fazhang Shidai, 2000 
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President Hu Jintao wrote the latest treatise on shi in 2009.19 It underlines five main 
points: (a) profound transformation; (b) a harmonious world; (c) common 
development; (d) shared responsibility and (e) active engagement. A more concise 
understanding of these main points is given by Party’s main outlet, Renmin Ribao. In 
its foreign policy analysis20, the article states that (a) “as a world power, China's 
vision is necessarily global, and it does not pay undue attention to any one country”; 
(b) “President Hu Jintao no longer tries to hide China's growing economic weight in 
global affairs and the role it will have to play in order to sustain growth”; (c) “To 
nourish this huge economic engine, China has to import an ever-increasing amount of 
resources from different parts of the world; (d) “it is essential for China to strive for a 
more stable and peaceful international environment” ; (e) “China has made it clear 
that it wants to build a harmonious world”. 
 
3.1.3 China  - a team player?  
How does this transform itself to foreign policy? Is China willing to be a part of a 
strategic partnership or an alliance? China’s is heavily involved in regional economic 
groups. Not only are they members, they have also expressed support of the major 
principles of multilateralism. The Chinese government has repeatedly stated that it 
advocates equality among members, open and free trade, investment and non-
discriminatory treatment. This is a far-shot from China that viewed multilateralism as 
a tool of Western imperialism.  
When it comes to security cooperation, China has been sceptical of entering or 
creating a single collective security organization, a la NATO, although there have 
been some changes to that view. In the Chinese IR community, one can discern an 
increasingly positive view on multilateral security arrangements, the main argument 
being that multilateral security arrangements could offer a mechanism to counter 
U.S.’s bilateral military alliances around the Asia-Pacific.  
China is also a founding member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 
                                                        
19 Liaowang Xinwen Zhoukan 2009.11.24, ’Hu Jintao shidaiguan de wu da Zhongguo Zuzhang’ 
20 Renmin Ribao 2006.12.30, China takes its place on international stage  
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with Russia and the Central Asian republics, member of the WTO and co-signee of 
numerous international treaties.  
China is indeed a productive and active member of the international society. 
However, the degree of China’s commitment to multilateral arrangements is 
constrained by its determination to maintain national sovereignty and its insistence 
of political flexibility. This points to a certain trait in China’s attitude towards the 
multilateralism, which is of essentially instrumental nature.  
 
3.2 Understanding Russian Foreign Policies 
Since the collapse of Soviet Union, Russia has been on a quest to elaborate a new 
foreign policy vision, one that would help a weakened Great Power confronting 
uncertainties of the new world order.21 In the early 1990s, with Yeltsin as a 
president, the world saw Russia undertaking major reforms, taking gigantic steps 
towards the democratic West – an experiment that failed miserably. This led to 
emergence of foreign scepticism and blooming of nationalism. The move to the west 
was then replaced with a determination to restore Russia as an independent 
international world actor with interests distinct from the liberal capitalist west. The 
foundation of this vision was the idea that Russia is a Great Power and although 
weakened, it had interests all over the world and a responsibility to protect itself 
from uncertainties and dangers present.  Russian political elite is therefore more 
inclined to play a role of a global power rather than integrating itself into regional 
blocks.22 As former foreign minister, Yevgeny Primakov repeatedly have noted – 
Russia is not an appendage or supplier of natural resources to the world market, but 
a major power with its own distinct national interests.23  This notion is also 
underlined by several official strategy documents.24 
While Russian foreign policy is global in scope, it is also at the same time constrained 
by domestic political considerations and internal rejuvenation. As Mankoff points 
                                                        
21 Mankoff 2009: 11 
22 Trenin 2003: 80  
23 Mankoff 2009: 12 
24 Russian MFA 2008 
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out, “Russia’s foreign policy has emphasized tactical flexibility and caution as it seeks 
a breathing space to recover the country’s strength.”25 As the country’s relative 
power is increasing, one can expect to see a much more expansionist and assertive 
Russia.  
3.2.1 Russian foreign policies towards China  
For Russia, China poses as an alternative to the west, whether as a successful model 
of economic development without political liberalization and/or as a pole it can align 
itself in opposition to the West. At the same time, as pointed out, because of Russian 
perception of itself as a distinctive element in the international society, it has 
maintained a wary partnership with China, based on economic cooperation and 
shared commitment to checking the American influence in the world. As a country 
uneasy with US-led western domination, for Russia, China, as an emerging world 
pole, is regarded as a natural partner in establishing a multi polar world order.  
On the other side, there is a degree of sinophobia present among Russians. Many 
Russian observers are very sceptical of their country’s close association to Beijing. 
For example, former foreign minister Kozyrev argued against close ties because he 
feared that China, as a stronger power, would be able to bend Russia to its ends than 
vice versa. By getting closer to China, he was also afraid of estranging the West.  
Many in Russia share Kozyrev’s perspective, especially among the pro-Western 
Russians. For them, seeking closer cooperation with China meant distancing itself 
from the West and vice-versa. In this sense, Russian westernizers and their 
opponents share a common and rather dichotomous outlook on China as a 
counterweight to the West.  
This dichotomous approach is somewhat a recent development in Russian foreign 
policy.26 Despite rapprochement with the west, Yeltsin in the yearly 1990s sought 
also to improve ties with China. The situation changed around mid-90s, when NATO 
started its expansion towards east and US-led intervention in Balkans happened. The 
idea of a multipolar world became much more prominent in both countries’ rhetoric. 
                                                        
25 Mankoff 2009: 39 
26 Ibid.: 199 
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In 1996, with downfall of Kozyrev and the ascendance of Primakov, the Sino-Russian 
strategic partnership has been established.  
For Russia, the partnership with China not only provided it means to successfully 
resist expansion of the West but also with an alternative concept of identity as a 
state lying in Eurasia rather than Europe.  
4. Sino-Russian relations after Soviet’s fall  
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the relationship between two giants has been 
dramatically improving. Less then forty years ago, the two countries were 
considered as enemies on the verge of nuclear confrontation.27 Today, the 
relationship has never been better.  The bilateral trade between two countries is 
growing at an unprecedented pace. According to former Russian president, 
Medvedev, the trade volume between the two countries is expected to reach $100 
billion in the next three to five years.28 This means almost a tripling from today.  
This staggering improvement between the two giants have spurred a strain of 
alarmist thoughts concerning the strategic alliance of the authoritarian countries, 
seeing this rapprochement as an apparent confluence of values and interests as 
inimical to the West. Such alarmism seems very plausible, given the recent events 
and records of China and Russia’s voting in the Security Council, but it is hardly 
justified.  
Much of the dynamics of early Sino - Russian relations were driven by the fact that 
Beijing’s relations with Moscow in the early years of the People’s Republic were 
close, but China was undeniably the junior partner. With the years, the nature of 
Sino-Russian relations has changed. The increase in Chinese relative power has 
spurred a whole different set of dynamics, driven by China increasing self-confidence 
and Russian concerns about China’s rise.  
 
                                                        
27 Lo 2009:  
28 China Daily 2011.06.16: Sino-Russian trade opportunities abound 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2011-06/16/content_12716429.htm 
 15 
Sino-Russian relations entered the limelight fully during the tenure of Vladimir Putin, 
when he became the president in 2000. The foundation though was very much laid 
by Gorbachev and built upon by Yeltsin.29  
Gorbachev was very much a very breakaway persona in the context of soviet 
leadership. Rather than relying on the military force, Gorbachev advocated ”New 
Thinking” in the foreign policy and chose to exercise political influence through 
diplomatic relations and economic cooperation. As a part of this new strategy, he 
persistently pursued closer relations with China. In order to restore the connection, 
Gorbachev went on to resolve the splitting issues between two countries, including 
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, deployment of Russian troops along China’s 
northern border and support for Vietnamese military presence in Cambodia. His 
efforts resulted in the Chinese government agreeing to a summit meeting in Beijing 
in May 1989, the first since the Sino-Soviet split in the 1950s.  
As the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Russian president Boris Yeltsin initially 
embarked on pursuing an overt pro-west alignment. Although, of course, 
representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs talked about the importance of 
China, they always emphasized the priority of the West. Less cautious leaders, such 
as former Russian Prime Minister, Yegor Gaidar, even made no secret of his attitude 
toward China as a dangerous and useless neighbour.30 Nevertheless, Chinese mission 
to Moscow succeeded in salvaging the gains of the previous decade in bilateral 
relations. The deputy foreign ministers of the two sides affirmed continuity with the 
bilateral agreements reached in 1989 and 1991, including the treaty on border 
demarcation, and agreed on the establishment of a joint economic, trade, and 
science and technology committee to improve relations.31 Li Peng and Boris Yeltsin 
reconfirmed these understandings a month later. As a result, the trade between the 
two countries exploded from 370 million to 6 billion USD by 1991.  
 
The following years marked two milestone agreements: delimitating the 4,200-
                                                        
29 Menon 2011: 104 
30 Lukin 2003 
31 Rozman 1997  
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kilometre eastern sector of the Russo-Chinese border, which entailed compromises 
on the ownership of islands in the Amur, Argun and Ussuri rivers and the 
delimitation agreement for the short, 55km stretch of border to the west, between 
Kazakhstan and Mongolia.32   
 
Despite some breakthroughs, liberal moves in Moscow undermined any realistic 
rapprochement between the two countries. The gradual shift started first in 1996-
1998, with Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin forging a strategic partnership.33 On his state visit 
to Beijing in 2000, Putin confirmed that Russia views China as a strategic partner. It is 
not until 2003 that one could observe a notable quickening of the pace of 
improvement. This emphasis continued notably under former president Medvedev, 
whose first overseas trip, apart from a brief stop in Kazakhstan, was to China.  
 
Several barriers had slowed down the evolution of Sino-Russian relationship and the 
success of Sino-Russian rapprochement has been possible mainly because of the 
parties’ ability to remove existing serious impediments. Ideological barriers fell in the 
post-Mao period. The two countries managed to work out most of the border 
disputes and stopped viewing each other as immediate military threats. By the mid-
1990s shared strategic interests became the driving force for closer ties in which the 
arm sales played a major role.  
 
Despite the considerable progress, it is also important to keep in mind many areas 
where China’s and Russia’s interests conflict. For every common ground, there are 
also divergent interests that hinder the cooperation reaching its full potential. Let us 
look at some of the overarching themes.  
 
4.1 Military Cooperation 
The amelioration of the relations between the countries was also spurred by the 
mutual disarmament and reduction in military deployments. The Russian 
disarmament was driven by the collapse of the Russian economy, while Chinese 
                                                        
32 Menon 2011: 105 
33 Bellaqua 2010: 14 
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wanted to save money and create a more modern force.34 As a result, China and 
Russia stopped viewing each other as major military threats. A significant outcome 
of this was the resumption of arms sales, which occurred under Yeltsin. By the time 
he resigned, on the last day of 1999, Russia had become China’s prime arms supplier. 
According to a study done by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI), in the period of 1991 – 2010, more than 90 per cent of China’s imported 
major conventional weapons were supplied by Russia, while China accounted for 
nearly 40 per cent of Russian exports.35 The arm sales between the two countries 
reached its pinnacle in 2005, which also interestingly marked the beginning of the 
decline in both Chinese interest in Russian military systems and Russian willingness 
to sell advanced technology to China. A possible explanation could stem from 
Chinese aspirations of producing the equipment themselves and unwillingness to 
buy out-of date technology from Russia. Russians on the other hand had about their 
own technology being someday used again it.  
 
4.2 Energy cooperation  
The fundamental reality driving China’s energy strategy globally, and in its energy 
relationship with Russia in particular is its inability to provide sufficient quantities of 
energy to satisfy its own domestic needs. China is a net importer of oil and has in 
2010 surpassed USA as the world’s largest energy consumer.36 Russia on other hand 
is world’s largest producer of both crude oil and both largest producer and exporter 
of natural gas.37  
 
There have been a number of breakthroughs in the energy cooperation between two 
countries that have manifested themselves in a number of practical and tangible 
ways. In December 2009, Vladimir Putin opened a new oil export terminal that will 
serve as a key gateway for Russian energy exports to Asian markets. The terminal 
was built at Kozmino, near Nakhodka, as part of Russia’s energy strategy of export 
                                                        
34 ibid.: 106 
35 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, <http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers> 
36 International Energy Agency, ‘China overtakes the United States to become world's largest 
energy consumer’, 20 July 2010, <http://www.iea.org/index_info.asp?id=1479> 
37 International Energy Agency ’Key World Energy Statistics 2011’   
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diversification to Eastern energy markets, which according to the plan should grow 
from the current 6 to 22–25% for liquid hydrocarbons (oil and oil products), and 
while natural gas export should grow from 0 to 19–20%.38 Many argue that this plan 
is highly unlikely as Russia, at the current production and extraction rates will not be 
able to sustain its own production as well as fulfil its energy commitments. However 
if China proves serious about developing its natural gas transport infrastructure and 
gas-fired power generation, the Sakhalin Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminal could 
help to represent a more realistic assessment of Russia’s Chinese dimension.  
 
As situations it is today, bilateral energy ties are one of the weaker areas of 
cooperation. Russians are concerned of being an energy appendage to the Chinese 
economy, while China seeks to diversify its energy sources. Despite the presence of 
complementary energy diversification priorities, cooperation in the energy sector 
has gone largely unfulfilled.  
 
4.3 Economic cooperation  
Although growing rapidly, the bilateral trade between the two countries is still very 
small. As of 2009, the total trade between two countries was 38.75 billion USD, 
marginally above Thailand and only one tenth of the trade volume between China 
and European Union. Beijing looks to Moscow mostly for natural resources – not 
only energy, but also timber and non-ferrous metals.39  This makes many Russian 
analysts worry that their country is engaging in some kind of neo-colonial economic 
relationship where primary commodities go out and finished goods go in.40 As 
mentioned earlier, energy cooperation is also far from strategic. There is Chinese 
interest in Russia as an expanding market for consumer and industrial goods, but 
Russia will remain of marginal importance compared to the huge markets in the 
West and the Asia-Pacific.  
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At present, China’s economic muscles are far greater than Russia’s. Chinese have 
every objective reasons to claim the title of the locomotive of Asian economy and 
the role of "active growth factor" of the global economy. However, further 
strengthening of China's position in the world economic system would certainly posit 
some serious problems for Chinese leaders, with the main roadblock being the 
country’s voracious appetite for natural resources. Accordingly, one can expect a 
long-term increased activity in China that aims to address or minimize this problem.  
When it comes to Russia, its position in the world economy have been formed in the 
first place by the country's ability to maintain and develop the strongest sectors of 
the Soviet legacy - gas, oil, wood, ferrous and nonferrous metals, seafood, military 
technology, nuclear energy, aerospace technology, etc. At the same time, Russia has 
not managed to win any new niches in the global market for goods and services. 
Most likely in the foreseeable future, the structure of Russia's participation in world 
economic relations will not undergo major changes.  
That being said, the area of shared interests and complementarities between Russia 
and China in the global economy is now wider than the area of their actual or 
potential conflict of interest41. This creates a stable platform to build and diversify 
forms of bilateral cooperation, for cooperation in the framework of the integration 
processes in East and Central Asia. However, the orientation of China's economic ties 
to the U.S, European and Asian markets limit the possibility of Russian - Chinese 
cooperation or joint action in the markets of third countries, and in the fight for the 
overall improvement of the conditions of international trade. A potential conflict of 
interest between the two countries can arise with Russia's inclusion into a free trade 
zone with China, leading to the uncontrolled mobility of goods and labour services 
from China to Russia. This is a scenario that Russia is not yet ready for42. In any case, 
however, the Russian side does believe that benefits of increased interaction 
between Russia and China outweigh the cons.  
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4.4 Central Asia 
There is an existing wariness inside the Kremlin of China’s possible geopolitical 
ambitions. In his speech given at Blagoveshchensk in 2000, the administrative capital 
of the Amur oblast, a city that was shelled by Chinese during the boxer rebellion, 
Putin declared that if “we do not undertake real efforts to develop the Russian Far 
East, then in a few decades the Russian population will be speaking Japanese, 
Chinese and Korean’. Medvedev delivered the same sentiment in 2008, during his 
trip in Russian Far East.  
Indeed Russians are wary of possible geopolitical ambitions China might have and 
many Russian officials continue to believe that China represents at least a potential 
rival.43 China’s military presence in the eastern central-Asian region is eminent. It’s 
armed forces border Tajikistan, Kirgizstan and Kazakhstan. Russia’s forces only 
border Kazakhstan. Given this in account, China can count on their cooperation with 
country’s security interests. The Russian Pacific Fleet has only 18 ocean-going ships, 
nearly all of which are obsolete. The Russian air presence in the Far East is equally 
troubled. The Chinese Air Force has purchased more modern aircraft from the 
Russian defence industry than the Russian Air Force.  
 
The increasing gap in economic and military weight between China and Russia 
continues to have important strategic consequences. China, using its increasing 
power, is trying to penetrate Russia’s traditional sphere of influence, namely Central 
Asia. The result has been an intensified struggle for influence and resources with 
both Moscow and Beijing seeking to lock up energy and pipelines for economic as 
well as geopolitical reasons. It is a battle that China is winning at the moment.  
On the other side Russians and Chinese both see a meaningful cooperation on 
countering the so-called three evils – Separatism, Terrorism and Extremism. This has 
resulted in a Regional Anti-Terrorist structure as a part of SCO. In August 2007, 
approximately 6500 from all six member of the SCO conducted largest joint military 
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exercises held by the group. Much of the same happened again in February 2009.44  
As a part of a statement regarding the ethnic riots in Xinjiang in 2009, SCO general 
secretary issued a statement regarding Xinjiang as an inalienable part of China and 
that all member vowed to enhance cooperation in fighting the three evils. 
4.5 Asia-Pacific 
Russia has strong economical interests in Asia-Pacific region. At the international 
level, Russia not only has to compete with China but also with U.S. and Japan. On the 
domestic level, the Russian leaders have to face the pressure of other political 
parties, interest groups, pro-Western faction that would rather see Russia 
developing their ties with the West, etc.  
 
With the end of the Cold War and the decline of its national strength as well as other 
external strategic adjustments, Russia's position in Southeast Asia has been greatly 
weakened. It only is barely able to maintain a limited military existence in Vietnam, 
but the consciousness of Russia being a great power was not completely lost. 
Russia's Southeast Asia policy was originally a continuity of the Asia-Pacific strategic 
thinking of the Gorbachev period. Economic ties and diplomacy would replace 
military means and ideology as a means of gaining influence and building 
participation in Southeast Asian affairs.45  
 
In November 2000, Putin pointed out in his speech on the future of Russia: New 
Oriental, Russian foreign policy will be firmly tilted to the Asia-Pacific, and Russia will 
actively develop relations with ASEAN in order to promote the ASEAN countries 
‘"common home construction’, and to maintain peace and stability in the region.  
From the geo-strategic perspective, as well as the international positioning of both 
the Russian and Southeast Asian countries, the fundamental conflict of interests 
does not exist. Their relationship reflects the post-Cold war state of dynamic and 
complex balance of power. Therefore ASEAN countries hold a positive attitude to 
Russia's participation in East Asian affairs, especially as a deterrent for China.  
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Overall, Russia's Southeast Asia policy is positive but not expansionary. Its main 
policy objectives are: in politics, focusing on restoring the world's great power 
status, seeking to increase their voice in the Asian and Pacific Affairs, strengthen 
cooperation with ASEAN and other security dialogue and cooperation of the parties 
in order to create a favorable geopolitical security environment. In the economy, 
Russia wants to actively participate in the integration of the Asia-Pacific region in 
order to aid their own economic recovery and develop an arms-export market46.  
 
China’s regional objectives in Southeast Asia appear to be tied to China’s overall 
strategic posture47: Maintain a stable political and security environment, particularly 
on China’s periphery, that will allow China’s economic growth to continue; Maintain 
and expand trade routes transiting Southeast Asia; Gain access to regional energy 
resources and raw materials; Develop trade relationships for economic and political 
purposes; Isolate Taiwan; Gain influence in the region to defeat perceived attempts 
at strategic encirclement or containment. For the past few years, China has been 
relatively active in regards to the last point, showing a growing assertiveness in the 
region. There is a prevalent view among Chinese analysts that the tensions can be 
attributed to US and its “returning to Asia” policy. It is widely believed that 
Washington is using the South China Sea issues as a means to pursue a soft 
containment of China.48 In that sense, Asia-Pacific region might prove to be a 
common ground for Sino-Russian cooperation in the future, as China doesn’t 
perceive Russia as a threat.  
 
4.6 International System 
One of the more visible aspects of Sino-Russian cooperation is their vetoing track 
record in the UN Security Council. Neither Russia nor China seem to be very 
comfortable with U.S.’ perceived leadership and the unipolar world order. 
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Multipolarity is the key concept in both Chinese and Russian foreign policy and both 
countries have repeatedly agreed on this term and subsequently have included it or 
alluded to it in nearly all of their joint declarations, statements, and treaties dating 
from the mid-1990s to the present.49 Indeed, the cooperation in the international 
system has been one of the more stable constants in Sino-Russian relations since the 
fall of Soviet Union. They have similar voting patterns and have also worked together 
at other multilateral forums, adopting much of the same stance on range of 
international issues. Opposition to sanction Iran, Sudan, North Korea opposition to 
missile defence and weaponization of the space and very lately in regards to 
situation in Syria, are one of the many issues that China and Russia cooperated on to 
the great aberration of the west.  
One of the plausible explanations explaining the similar worldview of the two vastly 
different crises is offered by Susan Turner, which puts everything in to the context of 
identity crisis that both countries have experienced.   
Ascendance of U.S as the primus motor in the new unipolar world order, have left 
both Chinese and Russian leader in disillusion as they have lost much influence in 
affecting world politics. Where they before had leverage in the super-power 
balancing game, both ended up being subjects to one “policing” superpower.50 China 
first experienced the ramifications of this in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square 
massacre, when the U.S. Congress suspended arms sales to China and attempted to 
make China’s most favoured nation (MFN) status contingent upon the improvement 
of its human rights record. China’s former foreign minister, Qian Qichen, declared 
the following year that “The USA’s hegemonic stance and its attempts to interfere in 
the internal affairs of other states pose the greatest danger to socialist China,” and 
suggested that in order to “weaken pressure from Washington, China must broaden 
relations with Japan, Russia, South Korea, and other neighbouring countries.”51 
Russians perceived USA as to be undermining Russian power by providing fewer 
post-war funds than Russia wanted and by keeping the North Atlantic Treaty 
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Organization (NATO) intact despite their objections. It was in the context of their 
“identity crisis” that China and Russia established a “constructive partnership” in 
September 1994. In 1996, the word “strategic” replaced “constructive” in defining 
the two countries’ partnership and Evgeny Primakov replaced the pro-Western 
Andrei Kozyrev as the new foreign minister of Russia. In 1997, the “Joint Russian-
Chinese Declaration about a Multipolar World and the Formation of a New World 
Order” was first among a string of statements emphasizing multipolarity and 
denouncing U.S. hegemony.52 
 
Although Russia and China both seemingly share the critique of hegemony and agree 
on the justice, peace, and stability inherent in a multipolar world order, the 
individual tone of each country’s leaders indicates a discrepancy in the means by 
which they might want to achieve this order. This was exemplified by the Russian 
Georgian conflict in 2008. Bearing their separatist movement in mind, Beijing 
refused to endorse Moscow’s actions at the SCO summit in Dushanbe, in 2008.  
 
Digging deeper into Chinese scholarly debates on Russia’s role in international 
system one will find two different, but widely regarded views. Some scholars argue 
that Russia is undergoing a decline in both prestige and influence and has already 
lost its power a superpower.53 Their view is that Russia lacks a long-lasting social 
foundation for a sustainable strong state and as long as Russia continues its 
development model of a “strong state and weak society”, its power and prosperity 
will not last.54   
 
The more optimistic scholars emphasize that even if Russia’s relative power has 
declined, it still is a “world state” with a potential to be a “world power” and 
therefore shouldn’t be underestimated. “Russia’s relative power and absolute power 
have actually made much headway as compared with the early years after the 
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collapse of the Soviet Union”55.    
 
4.7 Spheres of congruity  
In China’s foreign policy, USA occupies the top spot and Chinese analysts regard the 
Sino-US relations as the most important bilateral relations in the world.56  In 
developing its ties with US, China is seeking to carefully reduce American influence in 
East and Central Asia.  
 
Such actions are based on the concept of the multipolar world, a concept that is the 
official basis of the early stage of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership.  Relations 
with Russia are helping China to establish a more favourable external environment 
for itself. This is true especially, in regards to containing North Korea and getting an 
exclusive access to energy resources of the Russian Far East, which are out of the 
control of US and its allies, and thus a very important source of resource 
diversification. 
 
The most positive tangible result of the Sino-Russian partnership for Russia is the 
border agreements between Russia, China, and the Central Asian states.57 The 
border between the two countries is colossal and is more than 4000 km long. It was 
and still is in both countries interests to keep the border disputes at calm. China and 
Russia managed to resolve most of the border-related issues. As mentioned by 
former Russian ambassador to China, Rogachev, “it is the first time in the history 
that every inch of the border is legally agreed upon”. Removing the border issue and 
taking confidence building measures limitation of armaments in the 100-kilometer 
zone on both sides of the border reinforced political and military stability and made 
a solid foundation for further cooperation between the two giants.  
 
Apart from its geopolitical and geostrategic importance, Russia is an important 
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potential source of energy and raw material to China.58  China also believes that 
Russia can play a stabilizing role in Central Asia, especially in regards to curbing pan-
Turkish tendencies and extremist Islamic movements.  
 
Although on the decline, the military cooperation between China and Russia is still 
an important factor in the relationship and shouldn’t be overlooked. Despite the 
decline in sales of traditional arms and weapons, there is an interest on both sides in 
development of advanced weapons systems.59 This would help China to tilt the 
military balance in Asia (and especially in the Taiwan Strait) to its favor. However, it 
must be clear that military modernization is not the first priority for China, which is 
more focused on maintaining a strong economic as well as political system. This is 
why the importance of Sino-Russian military cooperation should not be 
overestimated.60 
 
With the increasing economic cooperation, China will gradually be able to exert 
more influence on Russia’s foreign, defense, and domestic policy, its economy, and 
the development of its demographic processes.61 This fact is underestimated in 
Russia, and also in Asia. Russians do view China as a key to its own economic 
development and thus are very interested in a seeing a prosperous and stable China 
- a China that could increasingly satisfy the needs of its population and that will open 
its market to Russian goods and services. This strategic Russian attitude to China 
only strengthens the rationale for future Russo-Chinese strategic cooperation.62   
 
The final congruity between China and Russia is the number of common threats and 
the fear of the long-term prospect of any unilateralist actions that might threaten 
either Russian or Chinese national interests.  
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4.8 Spheres of incongruity 
Although not present in the mainstream rhetoric, there is a latent sinophobia 
existing among Russian political elite. Especially in regards to the Russian Far East, 
China is regarded as a threat.63  
 
Another incompatibility of Russian and Chinese interests covers their strategic vision, 
especially regarding the Asia-Pacific region. Russia is an essentially a status-quo 
power in the region, clinging to positions that it won during the Soviet period. Having 
experienced a decline its economic, political and military muscles, Russia seeks to 
reduce regional tensions while concentrating on rebuilding its strength.  
It seeks to minimize or eliminate threats and maintain its dominant presence within 
its security zone, which encompasses the territory of the Russian Federation as well 
as the entire Commonwealth of Independent States. Although its military strength 
has declined, Russia seeks to maintain its strategic deterrence over all other states in 
Asia. It seeks to integrate its economy with those of the Asia-Pacific region, although 
its major economic orientation is toward the West.  
 
China, on the other hand, is essentially a revisionist power, seeking to gather the 
economic and military capabilities to compete with the United States and Japan on 
the regional and, in the near future, on the global stage.64 It seeks to maintain 
military superiority in the region, while trying to reduce the US presence regionally. 
In order to do so, it needs continued access to the energy.  
 
In the economic realm, as mentioned earlier, Russian and China have experienced a 
complete role reversal. Because of the collapse of Soviet Union and Russia’s need of 
complete economic restructuring, the size and value of Russian economy has shrunk 
to almost half of its former size. While China, once among the world’s poorest 
countries, has doubled its GDP and is now the world’s second largest economy. Its 
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rate of growth is no longer in the double-digit region, but still is formidable. The 
direction of their economies are diverging, but China and Russia still haven’t figured 
out a mutually beneficial and complementary economic model except from 
exchanging Russian energy and raw material for products of Chinese light industry. 
 
Demographic aspect of the relationship is not all too good either. The capital 
investment in Russian Far East has fallen and the region experiences population 
decline, despite large influx of both legal and illegal immigrants. The picture is 
completely different on the Chinese side, where the population density is ten times 
larger than the Russian side. As mentioned, Russians are wary of Chinese 
penetration of RFE and this may lead to local and central authorities implementing 
tough measures to curb the considerable loss of the Russian population in the 
region. 
 
5. Future Scenarios For Sino-Russian Relationship 
It is very tempting to evaluate or predict the relationship between China and Russian 
in simple terms of boom or bust, military-political alliance or a new schism. The 
reality is always far more complex that this. This chapter will explore some of the 
possible future scenarios of Sino-Russian partnership. But first, let us review what a 
Sino-Russian partnership is.  
 
The first point is that relationship between China and Russia is very normal, with its 
ups and downs filled with successes along with failures. In contrary to what many 
may believe, the strategic partnership between China and Russia is not a relationship 
of a new type65 but rather a traditional geopolitical partnership where each side is 
out to maximize its own national interests. Because China is a nation-state rather 
than value-driven multilateral agglomeration like the West, the very nature of the 
relationship is different. Simply put, China cannot offer Russia a prospect of 
integration into multilateral institutions like G8, WTO, etc. Therefore their 
relationship is based on rules and values.  
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Because geopolitics still matters, the preservation of geopolitical space and the 
projection of power remain central in China’s and Russia’s priorities.66 Russia is wary 
of China’s growing influence in Central Asia, while for China, a stable relationship 
with Russia means, among other things, one (long) border less to worry about.  
 
The partnership between China and Russia, as it is today, is limited. It is limited in 
scope, depth and mutual trust. Despite a substantial progress, many of the 
achievements reached by both countries, were relative and partial. As I’ve pointed 
out earlier, trade and economic cooperation is still small, military cooperation is 
dwindling, energy cooperation is not happening and there is an existing phobia of 
China present among the Russians. Because of this, they tend to respond, rather 
than initiate challenges in the world politics arenas. They tend to oppose, rather 
than to promote certain agendas in world affairs.67 
 
The partnership is asymmetrical. There is little convergence between the two 
countries’ perspectives, interests and capabilities. As I’ve mentioned earlier, where 
Russia regards itself as a world power, dominant power in post-Soviet space and as a 
regional “superpower”, China holds a much lower opinion of the country. The 
opposing perceptions have a critical impact on the policies of both countries’ policy. 
The practical outcome of such divergent perceptions is that China wouldn’t feel 
constrained to further expand its influence in Central-Asia, competing with Russia in 
the Asia-Pacific, etc.  
 
Attempting to forecast future or long-term trends is often a futile endeavour, 
because of so many variables that may change at any time. Nonetheless, let us 
identify the number of possible scenarios of development of Russian-Chinese 
relations in the near to medium term: 
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5.1. Status quo   
The most plausible and relatively easy executable scenario is an extrapolation of the 
current model of Russian-Chinese relations, where sufficiently intense political 
contact outpaces the level of trade and economic, cultural and social ties. In this 
case, the quality and the future of Sino-Russian relations will be affected by existing 
challenges between the two countries, alongside with other external factors. In 
other words, in this state, dependent on external as well as internal factors, 
relationship between China and Russia could either end in a convergence or tension. 
In this state, the Sino Russian partnership is relatively fragile and is dependent on a 
stable and prosperous future in both Russia and China. Actual reduction of Russia's 
place in the strategic priorities of China and China's place in Russia's strategic 
priorities could render the whole partnership to a mere formality. As Putin once 
pointed out “ the disposition of political forces and development trends will have a 
crucial impact on the future of the partnership68.   
5.2. Strategic convergence 
Strategic convergence scenario is based on the assumption that both countries will 
build upon achieved success and further enhance the cooperation. This would 
involve comprehensive deepening of Russian-Chinese cooperation based on a 
breakthrough in trade, economic and social ties. Large-scale development of trade 
and economic relations will facilitate the solution of a number of acute problems in 
bilateral relations (migration, anti-dumping investigations, etc.) and will also 
contribute to the solution of social problems of Siberia and the Far East. Parallel 
growth and co-development of China and Russia is the ideal scenario, from the point 
of view of Russian-Chinese cooperation. Strengthening of multilateral institutions 
such as SCO will provide conflict resolution mechanisms, defusing any tensions and 
eliminating the need for a ”Great Game”.  
The strategic convergence is one of the more plausible and convincing scenarios 
because it is a continuation of already established positive trends. It is politically 
flexible and wouldn’t lock China and Russia into a situation of choosing sides. The 
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external factors that drove China and Russia together are not going to disappear any 
time soon. Moscow will still be wary of NATO’s eastward expansion and China will 
still be concerned of U.S intentions towards Taiwan, Asia-Pacific region and the its 
security alliance with Japan.69 In the sense that a closer relationship with each other 
would represent leverage against U.S, neither China nor Russia would be willing to 
give it up any time soon.  
However, the implementation of such steps require considerable effort on the part 
of both Russia and China, as well as on enabling international environment and 
global economic environment. For the strategic convergence to happen, both Russia 
and China are dependent on a stable and prosperous growth – a factor that is not 
insulated from the external international environment. The relationship between 
China and Russia might as well end up in a … 
5.3. Strategic tension 
Strategic tension between two countries could occur in the event of neither Russia 
nor China doing sufficiently enough effort to deepen the existing relationship. 
Couple this with unfavourable external environment, the weaknesses and limitations 
of the relationship would soon become increasingly apparent. Lack of understanding 
and trust between the leaders and a significant part of the population of both 
countries, can lead to sudden intensification of unresolved or not fully resolved 
issues (road, oil, migration, etc.). This could lead to a backlash of anti-Russian or anti-
Chinese sentiment in both countries.  
In other words, one would see a trend of strengthening of negative elements and 
gradual falling out and/or even alienation between Moscow and Beijing. Under this 
scenario, Russia and China would engage in a typical tactical game with each other 
and limiting partnership only to areas of particular need. Rivalry in Central Asia 
would escalate to more overt dogfight for influence.70  The cooperation on 
international arenas would even more so reduced to rhetoric. One could also 
envisage the emergence of economic tension between the two countries.  
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5.4. Military-political alliance  
Both Chinese and Russian leaders have consistently denied any wish of entering into 
a formal alliance with each other. As Bobo Lo points out, ”the biggest problem with 
an alliance is that it is an inflexible course of action that demands considerable 
commitment.”71 A formal alliance between China and Russia would necessarily 
precipitate a new cold war, which is at the moment not in neither Russia’s or China’s 
interests. Despite for somewhat strained relationship with the US and the West, for 
the time being, both countries’ political, economic and security interests are closely 
tied to cooperative engagement with the West.  
There is though one scenario that could precipitate the Sino-Russian alliance. As we 
know, today it is the primus motor of Sino-Russian rapprochement is the shared 
strategic convergence, more specifically, the shared feeling of threat from 
unilateralist actions by the US.  The deepening and increasingly strategized Sino–
Russian rapprochement can thus be considered as a product of bilateral soft 
balancing strategy against US-led hegemony. Thus, in this regard, under certain 
circumstances such as America’s approval of NATO’s expansion inside the 
boundaries of the former Soviet Union72, the enacting of the Taiwan Security 
Enhancement Act, and/or the pursuing of a missile defense program despite strong 
opposition from Moscow and Beijing, could nudge the two closer together by 
pushing the security priorities to the first place. The two powers will then have 
enough ground to overcome all kinds of “limitations” by forming a relationship 
verging on an alliance.  
 
The reality of a military-political alliance is improbable but not impossible.  and is 
very much constrained by deep-seated mutual suspicions of each other. Despite all 
the vocal criticism of NATO enlargement, Russians still view China as a more likely 
military threat73, while PLA is suspicious of Russia’s long-term agenda in Eurasia.74  
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5.5 Confrontation 
The Sino-Soviet rupture and the following border clashes of 1969 showed us how 
quickly the relationship between two allies can deteriorate. It took only ten years 
after signing of the 1950 treaty for the latent conflicts to erupt. Same scenario could 
also play out today. The world today is far more globalized, intertwined and 
interdependent that back in 1960s, but dismissing the possibility for the 
confrontation would be unwise.  
There are several issues that could lead to a confrontation between China and 
Russia. The first one is the situation in Central Asia and the second one is RFE. In 
Central Asia, both powers vie for influence. Russia wishes to reassert its regional 
leadership, while China wants to expand and maximize its influence. Central Asia has 
an unsettling effect on both sides. Russia feels infringed by Chinese economic 
expansion. China on the other hand, while acknowledging Russian dominance in the 
region, sees that its scope of influence has reduced, especially when it comes to 
economic cooperation. In regards to RFE, China’s expansion into the region, coupled 
with longstanding Russian security anxieties is also a somewhat unbalancing factor.  
 
A change in foreign policy directions of the two countries could also precipitate a 
conflict. One cannot also exclude the emergence of more assertive and even 
aggressive foreign policy from both sides. Even though China still advocates the 
notion of peaceful rise, the contours of an offensive China is slowly emerging. 
Especially China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea has prompted a 
debate among China’s foreign-policy community75. For Russia, the change in foreign 
policy direction may come from something different. A recession, triggered by for 
example a slump in world commodity prices, could trigger what Bobo Lo calls a 
“siege mentality” where Russia sees threats everywhere. China would naturally be a 
target of Russia’s “paranoia”.  
 
An acute political crisis, followed by the fall of communist party in China, could also 
trigger a chain of events that could lead to a confrontation. This view is shared by 
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several Russian academics, the most notable being Alexei Voskressensky. He argues 
that “if reforms in China fail, there will be even more problems for Russia and 
China’s neighbouring countries (…) it will be practically impossible to contain the 
migration of huge masses of unemployed people from across the border”76.  
 
Likelihood of confrontation is rather small. The most obvious reason to that is the 
fact that both countries are in possession of nuclear weapons. A mere threat of 
mutually assured destruction would be enough to deter any sense of military 
adventurism. When it comes to the collapse of China, even though there are people 
today that think this will happen sooner rather than latter77, the assumption of 
China’s unravelling is rather speculative and is rather unlikely in the near future. 
Finally, even if China collapses, there have been on historical basis to anticipate mass 
influx of Chinese to Russia.78   
 
5.6 Concluding remarks 
It is all so tempting to see the Sino-Russian relationship as a paradigm shifting 
alliance that could potentially threaten the interests of the West. This relationship is 
almost too good to pass down. It has it all – two global powers tied together with 
remorse for western liberal principles in a quest to dethrone the U.S. led unipolar 
world. This was especially true for me, a master student, invested in both China and 
Russia, culturally, politically and linguistically. On one side you’ve an ailing, but 
natural resources-wise endowed ex-superpower, paranoid of everyone and 
everything, seeking to restore its former relevance in the international system. On 
the other side you have an emerging superpower, addicted on expansion and natural 
resources that seeks to tap into Russia’s vast reserves. The only thing binding them 
together is the somewhat convergent vision of a multipolar world. Their relationship 
is driven mostly by expediency and conjectural fluctuations of economy, relationship 
to US, etc. Although put together very bluntly, this reflects the reality of the 
situation.  
                                                        
76 Voskressensky: The Rise of China and Russo-Chinese relations. P. 28 
77 see Gordon Chang – The Comming Collapse of China, Random House 2001 
78 Lo 2008: 191  
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For China and Russia to truly establish a solid partnership, Moscow and Beijing will 
need to find a more constructive basis of engagement, like evolving their economic 
relationship. And of course, like everything else that is meaningful, 2this will require 
not only vision, but also the political will and perseverance to see the task through. 
But do Russian and Chinese leaders have this will?  
 
China and Russia both regard themselves as fallen powers on their quest to attain 
their former grandeur. Both have aspirations to be global powers with their own 
distinct set of national interests. As mentioned earlier, the degree of China’s 
commitment to bilateral or multilateral arrangements is constrained by its 
determination to maintain national sovereignty and its insistence of political 
flexibility. Essentially, I would argue that China views on strategic relationships are of 
instrumental nature. Simply put, China engages in a relationship as long as it has 
something to gain from it.  
 
Much of the same goes for Russia. Russia’s insistence on being treated like a World 
Power has endured through Yeltsin and long into the Putin era. Russian elites, 
thinkers and policy makers have long viewed their country in Great Power terms, 
with interests stretching all over the world and with a right to be consulted on every 
international matter of great importance. This consensus is so strong that Russian 
leaders will have no other choice than to pursue the creation of a multipolar world, 
with Russian being one of the poles.  
 
The West is still a top priority for Russian and Chinese policymakers and will still be 
in the near future. But as China enters the 21century apparently poised to become a 
new superpower, Russia will have little choice but to make China a priority in its own 
right, independent of Moscow’s relationship with the West. But right now, the 
relationship of between China and Russia is largely driven by the dynamics of 
superpower polarity rather than having a structure of its own.  
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